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Samo Tomšič 
The social implementation of neoliberalism has lead to a systematic removal of 
critical, dialectical and speculative thinking from the majority of academic and 
scientific institutions. As the predominating dogma goes, to think in a scientific 
way means to carry out applicable research; interdisciplinarity has become 
the main buzzword, which is accompanied by a watered down conception of 
scientificity. In the end, this conception combines a more or less superficial 
empiricist reductionism with a highly problematic fetishisation of technology. 
Interdisciplinarity does not stand for any challenging orientation of research, but 
rather for a peculiar euthanasia of thinking through the imposition of commodity 
form and through research management, whose main task is to transform 
scientific research activity and institutions into some kind of start-up companies 
— this is the main tendency of Lacan’s ‘university discourse’ today.
 We know that science is anything but a neutral field, floating above our 
banal capitalist reality; it is rather a conflictual field, where political confrontation 
is constantly at stake, something like a generalised ‘class-struggle in theory’ 
as formulated by Althusser. The endeavour for a dialectical and materialist 
conception of science, against the predominant technicist and empiricist 
epistemologies, is merely one expression of such ‘class-struggle’, where the 
endeavour for detaching scientific research from the imperatives of the market 
in fact leads to a broader confrontation concerning the conception of political 
subjectivity, the nature of thinking and the critical role of science.
 The autonomy of theory is today more than ever considered a 
scandal and a luxury. For this reason the struggle for a critical conception of 
scientificity, which does not subscribe to the instrumentalization of research and 
consequently of thinking as such, is all the more necessary. Our contemporary 
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advocates of interdisciplinarity often openly impose the idea that scientificity 
necessitates a rejection of critical, speculative and dialectical orientation of 
thinking, replacing it with its ‘realistic’ and ‘sound’ opposite: the technicist, 
instrumentalist and reductionist thinking. With this “realistic regression”, the 
central feature of thinking is excluded: alienation, which has been preoccupying 
philosophical thought throughout modernity and which has been most 
systematically theorised in Hegel’s philosophical system, Marx’s critique of 
political economy and Freud’s psychoanalysis (to name only the prominent 
ones, in the shadow of which we will hopefully remain for a while longer). What 
unites these thinkers is the — for our ideological times — outrageous idea 
that, to think ‘freely’ in the last instance comes down to exposing oneself to 
negativity, decentralisation, contradiction… in thinking. What is Hegel’s dialectics 
other than the movement of thinking qua contradiction, which produces a series 
of critical consequences? What is Marx’s critique of fetishism other than the kick 
off of a materialist insight into the repressed truth of social mechanisms? And 
finally, what is Freud’s psychoanalytic method other than the royal path to the 
discovery of constitutively decentralised nature of thinking? 
 Based on these three examples one can argue that the freedom of 
thinking consists precisely in the possibility and the right to think inadequately, 
against the superficial and false ‘realism of facts’ or appearances. Thinking 
is most free when it encounters its own cracks, slips and breakdowns, which 
means as much as experiencing the inadequacy of both thinking and the 
fetishised facticity with themselves. Hence, to think means in the first place to 
think against the discourse of facts, or to put it in yet another way, thinking 
encloses the possibility of error. In the end, did not all major philosophical 
breakthroughs and scientific revolutions always consist in the confrontation 
with an apparently insurmountable obstacle, which gave rise to a series of 
failed and erroneous attempts of its overcoming? Haven’t they confronted the 
inconsistency of reality, which has always been consequently accompanied by 
or reflected in a contradiction of thinking? No surprise, then, that Lacan took 
seriously Freud’s minimalist epistemological suggestion, according to which the 
revolutionary sequence of modern science got complete only with the invention 
of psychoanalysis: with a systematic theorisation of the decentralised nature 
of thinking under the concept of the unconscious. There is no psychoanalysis 
without the preceding revolution in physics and biology – but there is strictly 
speaking no scientific revolution without its extended repetition in the field of 
sciences, which treat of human objects: language, knowledge, subjectivity. 
 A critical epistemology would insist that error expresses nothing other 
than the immanent split of thinking, its inconsistent and conflictual character 
that was brought to the point in psychoanalysis. One could say that the 
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concept of the unconscious is an adequate theoretical representation of the 
inadequacy of thinking. And it is this inadequacy (rather than in some fictitious 
neutral observer, subject of cognition or start-up entrepreneur, this modern day 
homo oeconomicus) that operates as the negative foundation of scientificity, 
a foundation that, by confronting thinking with its own inconsistency, throws 
thinking out of joint. This does not mean that one should be apologetic 
toward every systematised delirium, but rather that thinking reclaims its right 
of exaggeration of facticity. Thought is an amplifier, which, by exaggerating 
appearances, breaks the restrictive ideological regime of the factual. The right to 
challenge the frames of possible (another way to describe intellectual freedom) 
means to encounter, in the order of things, a point where reality turns out to be 
inconsistent and disfunctioning. Thought fully exercises its immanent freedom 
by mobilising this inadequacy in order to bring about transformative effects. 
That is indeed thinking with consequences: critique, dialectics, speculation 
– which, again, are all conditioned by the possibility of error as their main 
driving force. The symptomatic truth addressed by this form of thinking could 
be defined with a minimal correction of the classic doctrine: inadequatio rei 
et intellectus. Where there is inadequate relation, non-relation, there thinking 
encounters its own freedom. The enigmatic philosophical name for this freedom 
is nothing other than alienation.
